Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk

Oscar Volij

doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00054-X

Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk

Oscar Volij

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper considers single item auctions in the private values framework, with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of Yaari's [Econometrica 55 (1987) 95] dual theory of choice under risk. It is shown that when their valuations are independently distributed, risk averse buyers are indifferent among all the auctions contained in a large family of mechanisms that includes the standard auctions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	231-237
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	76
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00054-X
State	Published - 1 Jul 2002
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Auctions
Non-expected utility
Risk aversion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00054-X

Cite this

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abstract = "This paper considers single item auctions in the private values framework, with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of Yaari's [Econometrica 55 (1987) 95] dual theory of choice under risk. It is shown that when their valuations are independently distributed, risk averse buyers are indifferent among all the auctions contained in a large family of mechanisms that includes the standard auctions.",

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AB - This paper considers single item auctions in the private values framework, with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of Yaari's [Econometrica 55 (1987) 95] dual theory of choice under risk. It is shown that when their valuations are independently distributed, risk averse buyers are indifferent among all the auctions contained in a large family of mechanisms that includes the standard auctions.

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KW - Non-expected utility

KW - Risk aversion

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0035997436

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DO - 10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00054-X

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Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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