Payoffs in nondifferentiable perfectly competitive TU economies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


We show that a single-valued solution of nonatomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51, D61.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)17-39
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Sep 2002


  • Core selection
  • Market games
  • Mertens value
  • TU economies

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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