Payoffs in nondifferentiable perfectly competitive TU economies

Ori Haimanko

doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2826

Payoffs in nondifferentiable perfectly competitive TU economies

Ori Haimanko

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that a single-valued solution of nonatomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51, D61.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	17-39
Number of pages	23
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	106
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2826
State	Published - 1 Sep 2002

Keywords

Core selection
Market games
Mertens value
TU economies

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/jeth.2001.2826

Cite this

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Payoffs in nondifferentiable perfectly competitive TU economies

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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