Perceived moral objectivity: Why some moral issues seem more objective than others

An objectivist perception of morality holds that moral questions have universal, absolute, and singular correct answers. We tested whether perceived moral objectivity (PMO) varies across specific moral domains, using the taxonomy of moral domains provided by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). We hypothesized that care, fairness, liberty and purity foundations would have higher PMO than loyalty and authority. In five studies (N_Study1 = 213, N_Study2 = 107, N_Study3 = 121,N_Study4 = 136, N_Study5 = 124), participants judged the moral wrongness of moral violations and rated the objectivity of that judgment for violations in the six moral foundations identified in MFT. We also measured endorsement of each foundation, religiosity and political orientation, trait PMO (Studies 3–5), and disgust and perceived consensus around the judged moral wrongness of each violation (Studies 4–5). As predicted, we found higher PMO ratings for violations pertaining to care, fairness, and purity than for violations pertaining to liberty, loyalty, and authority, even after controlling for moral judgment and endorsement of the foundation. In addition, disgust and perceived consensus predicted higher PMO, even when controlling for the aforementioned variables. Finally, religiosity and conservatism predicted PMO, even when controlling for foundation endorsement. Overall, our findings reveal robust differences in meta-ethical beliefs between moral foundations, thus extending the application of MFT to meta-ethics. These insights hold practical implications for political polarization, suggesting it is highly likely to surround issues pertaining to care, fairness, and purity.