Through a critical discussion of Hanoch Ben-Yami's argument about the value of philosophy in his 'Aristotle's Hand: Five Philosophical Investigations' (2012), I argue that it is untenable to support Ben-Yami's two central claims together: On the one hand, he relegates philosophy to the role of handmaid to the sciences; on the other hand, he assigns philosophy therapeutic value, thus ascribing to a form of quietism. A thicker conception of understanding, enables us to grasp philosophy's value, not as a handmaid to science, but as contributing to the many ways of grasping and interpreting the meaning of things. Related to this, not all quietiest are the same and for the quietist who views language as a set of social practices, drawing linguistic distinctions and fabricating interpretations is a way of broadening our understanding and making sense of the world.
|Original language||English GB|
|Number of pages||6|
|Journal||Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly|
|State||Published - 1 Jan 2015|