Power Consumption-based Detection of Sabotage Attacks in Additive Manufacturing

Samuel B. Moore, Jacob Gatlin, Sofia Belikovetsky, Mark Yampolskiy, Wayne E. King, Yuval Elovici

Research output: Working paper/PreprintPreprint

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Abstract

Additive Manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D Printing, is increasingly used to manufacture functional parts of safety-critical systems. AM's dependence on computerization raises the concern that the AM process can be tampered with, and a part's mechanical properties sabotaged. This can lead to the destruction of a system employing the sabotaged part, causing loss of life, financial damage, and reputation loss. To address this threat, we propose a novel approach for detecting sabotage attacks. Our approach is based on continuous monitoring of the current delivered to all actuators during the manufacturing process and detection of deviations from a provable benign process. The proposed approach has numerous advantages: (i) it is non-invasive in a time-critical process, (ii) it can be retrofitted in legacy systems, and (iii) it is airgapped from the computerized components of the AM process, preventing simultaneous compromise. Evaluation on a desktop 3D Printer detects all attacks involving a modification of X or Y motor movement, with false positives at 0%.
Original languageEnglish
StatePublished - 6 Sep 2017

Keywords

  • cs.CR

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