Preferential attachment as a unique equilibrium

Chen Avin, Avi Cohen, Pierre Fraigniaud, Zvi Lotker, David Peleg

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

    7 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    This paper demonstrates that the Preferential Attachment rule naturally emerges in the context of evolutionary network formation, as the unique Nash equilibrium of a simple social network game. In this game, each node aims at maximizing its degree in the future, representing its social capital in the "society" formed by the nodes and their connections. This result provides additional formal support to the commonly used Preferential Attachment model, initially designed to capture the "rich get richer" aphorism. In the process of establishing our result, we expose new connections between Preferential Attachment, random walks, and Young»s Lattice.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationThe Web Conference 2018 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2018
    PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
    Pages559-568
    Number of pages10
    ISBN (Electronic)9781450356398
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 10 Apr 2018
    Event27th International World Wide Web, WWW 2018 - Lyon, France
    Duration: 23 Apr 201827 Apr 2018

    Publication series

    NameThe Web Conference 2018 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2018

    Conference

    Conference27th International World Wide Web, WWW 2018
    Country/TerritoryFrance
    CityLyon
    Period23/04/1827/04/18

    Keywords

    • Network formation games
    • Preferential attachment
    • Random walks
    • Social networks
    • Young's lattice

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Software

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