Preferential attachment as a unique equilibrium

Chen Avin, Avi Cohen, Pierre Fraigniaud, Zvi Lotker, David Peleg

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that the Preferential Attachment rule naturally emerges in the context of evolutionary network formation, as the unique Nash equilibrium of a simple social network game. In this game, each node aims at maximizing its degree in the future, representing its social capital in the "society" formed by the nodes and their connections. This result provides additional formal support to the commonly used Preferential Attachment model, initially designed to capture the "rich get richer" aphorism. In the process of establishing our result, we expose new connections between Preferential Attachment, random walks, and Young»s Lattice.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Web Conference 2018 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2018
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages559-568
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9781450356398
DOIs
StatePublished - 10 Apr 2018
Event27th International World Wide Web, WWW 2018 - Lyon, France
Duration: 23 Apr 201827 Apr 2018

Publication series

NameThe Web Conference 2018 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2018

Conference

Conference27th International World Wide Web, WWW 2018
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityLyon
Period23/04/1827/04/18

Keywords

  • Network formation games
  • Preferential attachment
  • Random walks
  • Social networks
  • Young's lattice

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software

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