Preserving Consistency for Liquid Knapsack Voting

Pallavi Jain, Krzysztof Sornat, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Liquid Democracy (LD) uses transitive delegations in voting. In its
simplest form, it is used for binary decisions, however its promise
holds also for more advanced voting settings. Here we consider LD in the context of Participatory Budgeting (PB), which is a direct democracy approach to budgeting, most usually done in municipal budgeting processes. In particular, we study Knapsack Voting, in which PB voters approve projects, such that the sum of costs of projects each voter approves must respect the budget limit. We observe possible inconsistencies, as the cost of voter-approved projects may go over the budget limit after resolving delegations. We offer ways to overcome them by studying the computational complexity of updating as few delegations as possible to arrive— after following all project delegations—to a consistent profile.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Pages1542-1544
Number of pages3
StatePublished - 2021

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