Prizes versus wages with envy and pride

Pradeep Dubey; John Geanakoplos; Ori Haimanko

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00564.x

Prizes versus wages with envy and pride

Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Ori Haimanko

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that if agents are risk-neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk-averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	98-121
Number of pages	24
Journal	Japanese Economic Review
Volume	64
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00564.x
State	Published - 1 Mar 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00564.x

Cite this

@article{0318c3f1fe6e458f9e374ba11887f774,

title = "Prizes versus wages with envy and pride",

abstract = "We show that if agents are risk-neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk-averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).",

author = "Pradeep Dubey and John Geanakoplos and Ori Haimanko",

year = "2013",

month = mar,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00564.x",

language = "English",

volume = "64",

pages = "98--121",

journal = "Japanese Economic Review",

issn = "1352-4739",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Prizes versus wages with envy and pride

AU - Dubey, Pradeep

AU - Geanakoplos, John

AU - Haimanko, Ori

PY - 2013/3/1

Y1 - 2013/3/1

N2 - We show that if agents are risk-neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk-averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).

AB - We show that if agents are risk-neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk-averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84873295670&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00564.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00564.x

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84873295670

SN - 1352-4739

VL - 64

SP - 98

EP - 121

JO - Japanese Economic Review

JF - Japanese Economic Review

IS - 1

ER -

Prizes versus wages with envy and pride

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this