Promotion policies of workers who observe their ability

David Wettstein; Ori Zax

Promotion policies of workers who observe their ability

David Wettstein, Ori Zax

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze promotion policy when workers are privately informed regarding their abilities at the outset of their careers. We show that the resulting equilibrium outcomes coincide with the outcomes derived in the standard promotion framework where workers and firms do not possess private information at the start of their relationship (Waldman 1984).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2509-2514
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Volume	38
Issue number	4
State	Published - 1 Jan 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)

Cite this

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abstract = "We analyze promotion policy when workers are privately informed regarding their abilities at the outset of their careers. We show that the resulting equilibrium outcomes coincide with the outcomes derived in the standard promotion framework where workers and firms do not possess private information at the start of their relationship (Waldman 1984).",

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Promotion policies of workers who observe their ability

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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