Promotion policies of workers who observe their ability

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze promotion policy when workers are privately informed regarding their abilities at the outset of their careers. We show that the resulting equilibrium outcomes coincide with the outcomes derived in the standard promotion framework where workers and firms do not possess private information at the start of their relationship (Waldman 1984).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2509-2514
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume38
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)

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