Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information

Ezra Einy; Ori Haimanko

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.004

Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We prove the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games with absolutely continuous information and a Bayesian potential that is upper semi-continuous in actions for any realization of the players' types. In particular, all Bayesian potential games with finitely many actions and absolutely continuous information possess a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	341-347
Number of pages	7
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	140
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.004
State	Published - 1 Jul 2023

Keywords

Absolute continuity of information
Bayesian games
Bayesian potential
Continuous payoffs
Pure-strategy equilibrium
Purification

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.004

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title = "Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information",

abstract = "We prove the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games with absolutely continuous information and a Bayesian potential that is upper semi-continuous in actions for any realization of the players' types. In particular, all Bayesian potential games with finitely many actions and absolutely continuous information possess a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.",

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AB - We prove the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games with absolutely continuous information and a Bayesian potential that is upper semi-continuous in actions for any realization of the players' types. In particular, all Bayesian potential games with finitely many actions and absolutely continuous information possess a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

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KW - Bayesian games

KW - Bayesian potential

KW - Continuous payoffs

KW - Pure-strategy equilibrium

KW - Purification

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Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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