Ranking asymmetric auctions

Arieh Gavious, Yizhaq Minchuk

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations


We compare the expected revenue in first- and second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. We consider "close to uniform" distributions with identical supports and show that in the case of identical supports the expected revenue in second-price auctions may exceed that in first-price auctions. We also show that asymmetry over lower valuations has a stronger negative impact on the expected revenue in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions. However, asymmetry over high valuations always increases the revenue in first-price auctions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)369-393
Number of pages25
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2014


  • Asymmetric auctions
  • Perturbation analysis
  • Ranking auctions
  • Revenue equivalence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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