Abstract
We compare the expected revenue in first- and second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. We consider "close to uniform" distributions with identical supports and show that in the case of identical supports the expected revenue in second-price auctions may exceed that in first-price auctions. We also show that asymmetry over lower valuations has a stronger negative impact on the expected revenue in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions. However, asymmetry over high valuations always increases the revenue in first-price auctions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 369-393 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jan 2014 |
Keywords
- Asymmetric auctions
- Perturbation analysis
- Ranking auctions
- Revenue equivalence
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty