Ranking asymmetric auctions

Arieh Gavious; Yizhaq Minchuk

doi:10.1007/s00182-013-0383-9

Ranking asymmetric auctions

Arieh Gavious
, Yizhaq Minchuk

Department of Industrial Engineering and Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

We compare the expected revenue in first- and second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. We consider "close to uniform" distributions with identical supports and show that in the case of identical supports the expected revenue in second-price auctions may exceed that in first-price auctions. We also show that asymmetry over lower valuations has a stronger negative impact on the expected revenue in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions. However, asymmetry over high valuations always increases the revenue in first-price auctions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	369-393
Number of pages	25
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	43
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0383-9
State	Published - 1 Jan 2014

Keywords

Asymmetric auctions
Perturbation analysis
Ranking auctions
Revenue equivalence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1007/s00182-013-0383-9

Cite this

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AB - We compare the expected revenue in first- and second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. We consider "close to uniform" distributions with identical supports and show that in the case of identical supports the expected revenue in second-price auctions may exceed that in first-price auctions. We also show that asymmetry over lower valuations has a stronger negative impact on the expected revenue in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions. However, asymmetry over high valuations always increases the revenue in first-price auctions.

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KW - Perturbation analysis

KW - Ranking auctions

KW - Revenue equivalence

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ER -

Ranking asymmetric auctions

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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