@inproceedings{02886b880e9a47bc9cdae2489c814a71,
title = "Redesigning Bitcoin's fee market",
abstract = "The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: Users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin's challenges are (i) securing sufficient miner revenues as block rewards decrease, and (ii) alleviating the throughput limitation due to a small maximal block size cap. These issues are strongly related as increasing the maximal block size may decrease revenue due to Bitcoin's pay-your-bid approach. To decouple them, we analyze the “monopolistic auction” [8], showing: (i) its revenue does not decrease as the maximal block size increases, (ii) it is resilient to an untrusted auctioneer (the miner), and (iii) simplicity for transaction issuers (bidders), as the average gain from strategic bid shading (relative to bidding one's true maximal willingness to pay) diminishes as the number of bids increases.",
keywords = "Auction-Theory, Bitcoin, Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, Fee-market",
author = "Ron Lavi and Or Sattath and Aviv Zohar",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 IW3C2 (International World Wide Web Conference Committee), published under Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 License.; 2019 World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2019 ; Conference date: 13-05-2019 Through 17-05-2019",
year = "2019",
month = may,
day = "13",
doi = "10.1145/3308558.3313454",
language = "English",
series = "The Web Conference 2019 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2019",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery, Inc",
pages = "2950--2956",
booktitle = "The Web Conference 2019 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2019",
}