Abstract
We study standard rent-seeking contests with reimbursement and sabotaging. This study is conducted for a symmetric model with complete information. We show that changing the contest mechanism by applying a form of reimbursement could be an effective tool against sabotaging, in addition to the fact that it increases contest designer revenue. Simple changes such as sufficient reimbursement to winners/losers might completely stop sabotaging efforts in the contest.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 235-238 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Managerial and Decision Economics |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jan 2021 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Strategy and Management
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Management of Technology and Innovation