Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

Gadi Fibich; Arieh Gavious; Aner Sela

doi:10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5

Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

36 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	309-321
Number of pages	13
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	115
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5
State	Published - 1 Jan 2004

Keywords

Asymmetric auctions
Perturbation analysis
Revenue equivalence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5

Cite this

@article{c9c8b9c704ae4b61b90378b4f6b59ea9,

title = "Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions",

abstract = "The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function.",

keywords = "Asymmetric auctions, Perturbation analysis, Revenue equivalence",

author = "Gadi Fibich and Arieh Gavious and Aner Sela",

year = "2004",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5",

language = "English",

volume = "115",

pages = "309--321",

journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

AU - Fibich, Gadi

AU - Gavious, Arieh

AU - Sela, Aner

PY - 2004/1/1

Y1 - 2004/1/1

N2 - The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function.

AB - The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function.

KW - Asymmetric auctions

KW - Perturbation analysis

KW - Revenue equivalence

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=1942510362&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5

DO - 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:1942510362

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 115

SP - 309

EP - 321

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 2

ER -

Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this