Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

36 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)309-321
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume115
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2004

Keywords

  • Asymmetric auctions
  • Perturbation analysis
  • Revenue equivalence

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