Revenue in contests with many participants

Arieh Gavious; Yizhaq Minchuk

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2013.12.008

Revenue in contests with many participants

Arieh Gavious, Yizhaq Minchuk

Department of Industrial Engineering and Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that in a contest with a single prize, the expected effort made by the kth highest valuation participant bounds the sum of the expected efforts made by all of the participants with valuations less than the kth highest valuations. We also show that in the limit case of a contest with m prizes, the expected effort made by the kth highest valuation participant when the bidders are risk-neutral is greater than the expected effort in the risk-averse case.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	119-122
Number of pages	4
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	42
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.12.008
State	Published - 1 Jan 2014

Keywords

All-pay auction
Contest
Revenue
Risk aversion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.orl.2013.12.008

Cite this

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AB - We show that in a contest with a single prize, the expected effort made by the kth highest valuation participant bounds the sum of the expected efforts made by all of the participants with valuations less than the kth highest valuations. We also show that in the limit case of a contest with m prizes, the expected effort made by the kth highest valuation participant when the bidders are risk-neutral is greater than the expected effort in the risk-averse case.

KW - All-pay auction

KW - Contest

KW - Revenue

KW - Risk aversion

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Revenue in contests with many participants

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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