Reverse contests

Aner Sela

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2021.05.002

Reverse contests

Aner Sela

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study two forms of a reverse contest. In reverse contest A the designer imposes a punishment such that the agent with the highest effort who caused the greatest damage is punished. Conversely, in reverse contest B, the designer awards a prize to the agent with the lowest effort who caused the smallest damage. We analyze the behavior of the agents in both contest forms and demonstrate that asymmetry of the players' payoff functions does not necessarily yield different expected payoffs.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	439-441
Number of pages	3
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	49
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.05.002
State	Published - 1 May 2021

Keywords

Contests
Prizes
Punishments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.orl.2021.05.002

Cite this

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AB - We study two forms of a reverse contest. In reverse contest A the designer imposes a punishment such that the agent with the highest effort who caused the greatest damage is punished. Conversely, in reverse contest B, the designer awards a prize to the agent with the lowest effort who caused the smallest damage. We analyze the behavior of the agents in both contest forms and demonstrate that asymmetry of the players' payoff functions does not necessarily yield different expected payoffs.

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KW - Prizes

KW - Punishments

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Reverse contests

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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