RFID Authentication Efficient Proactive Information Security within Computational Security

We consider repeated communication sessions between a RFID Tag (e. g., Radio Frequency Identification, RFID Tag) and a RFID Verifier. A proactive information theoretic security scheme is proposed. The scheme is based on the assumption that the information exchanged during at least one of every n successive communication sessions is not exposed to an adversary. The Tag and the Verifier maintain a vector of n entries that is repeatedly refreshed by pairwise xoring entries, with a new vector of n entries that is randomly chosen by the Tag and sent to the Verifier as a part of each communication session. The general case in which the adversary does not listen in k≥1 sessions among any n successive communication sessions is also considered. A lower bound of n · (k+1) for the number of random numbers used during any n successive communication sessions is proven. In other words, we prove that an algorithm must use at least n · (k+1) new random numbers during any n successive communication sessions. Then a randomized scheme that uses only O(nlog n) new random numbers is presented. A computational secure scheme which is based on the information theoretic secure scheme is used to ensure that even in the case that the adversary listens in all the information exchanges, the communication between the Tag and the Verifier is secure.