RFID-based electronic voting: What could possibly go wrong?

Yossef Oren, Avishai Wool

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

When Israel's Ministry of Internal Affairs decided to move to electronic voting, it chose to replace the traditional paper ballot with secure contactless smartcards. The system was designed around HF RFID technology to make voting stations easier to use and less prone to mechanical faults. However, in doing so the system was exposed to a powerful class of hardware-based attacks called relay attacks, which can extend the interrogation range of HF RFID tags far beyond the nominal range of 5 centimetres. We show how a low-budget adversary armed with a relay device can read out all votes already cast into the ballot box, suppress the votes of one or several voters, rewrite votes at will and even completely disqualify all votes in a single voting station. Our attacks are easy to mount, very difficult to detect, and compromise both the confidentiality and the integrity of the election system.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRFID 2010
Subtitle of host publicationInternational IEEE Conference on RFID
Pages118-125
Number of pages8
DOIs
StatePublished - 29 Jun 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event4th Annual IEEE International Conference on RFID, RFID 2010 - Orlando, FL, United States
Duration: 14 Apr 201015 Apr 2010

Publication series

NameRFID 2010: International IEEE Conference on RFID

Conference

Conference4th Annual IEEE International Conference on RFID, RFID 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityOrlando, FL
Period14/04/1015/04/10

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