Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems

Shlomi Dolev, Elad M. Schiller, Paul G. Spirakis, Philippas Tsigas

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Distributed algorithm designers often assume that system processes execute the same predefined software. Alternatively, when they do not assume that, designers turn to non-cooperative games and seek an outcome that corresponds to a rough consensus when no coordination is allowed. We argue that both assumptions are inapplicable in many real distributed systems, e.g., the Internet, and propose designing self-stabilizing and Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed game authorities. Once established, the game authority can secure the execution of any complete information game. As a result, we reduce costs that are due to the processes' freedom of choice. Namely, we reduce the price of malice.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)69-84
Number of pages16
JournalComputer Science Review
Volume5
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Feb 2011

Keywords

  • Distributed computing
  • Folk-theorem
  • Game theory
  • Self-stabilization

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