Robustness among multiwinner voting rules

Robert Bredereck; Piotr Faliszewski; Andrzej Kaczmarczyk; Rolf Niedermeier; Piotr Skowron; Nimrod Talmon

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_7

Robustness among multiwinner voting rules

Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Rolf Niedermeier, Piotr Skowron, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate how robust are results of committee elections to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single preference order is either that (1) at most one committee member can be replaced, or (2) it is possible that the whole committee can be replaced. We also show that the problem of computing the smallest number of swaps that lead to changing the election outcome is typically NP-hard, but there are natural FPT algorithms. Finally, for a number of rules we assess experimentally the average number of random swaps necessary to change the election result.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, Proceedings
Editors	Vittorio Bilo, Michele Flammini
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	80-92
Number of pages	13
ISBN (Print)	9783319666990
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_7
State	Published - 1 Jan 2017
Externally published	Yes
Event	10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2017 - L’Aquila, Italy Duration: 12 Sep 2017 → 14 Sep 2017

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	10504 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2017
Country/Territory	Italy
City	L’Aquila
Period	12/09/17 → 14/09/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_7

Cite this

Bredereck, R., Faliszewski, P., Kaczmarczyk, A., Niedermeier, R., Skowron, P., & Talmon, N. (2017). Robustness among multiwinner voting rules. In V. Bilo, & M. Flammini (Eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, Proceedings (pp. 80-92). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 10504 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_7

Bredereck, Robert ; Faliszewski, Piotr ; Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej et al. / Robustness among multiwinner voting rules. Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, Proceedings. editor / Vittorio Bilo ; Michele Flammini. Springer Verlag, 2017. pp. 80-92 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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abstract = "We investigate how robust are results of committee elections to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single preference order is either that (1) at most one committee member can be replaced, or (2) it is possible that the whole committee can be replaced. We also show that the problem of computing the smallest number of swaps that lead to changing the election outcome is typically NP-hard, but there are natural FPT algorithms. Finally, for a number of rules we assess experimentally the average number of random swaps necessary to change the election result.",

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Bredereck, R, Faliszewski, P, Kaczmarczyk, A, Niedermeier, R, Skowron, P & Talmon, N 2017, Robustness among multiwinner voting rules. in V Bilo & M Flammini (eds), Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 10504 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 80-92, 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2017, L’Aquila, Italy, 12/09/17. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_7

Robustness among multiwinner voting rules. / Bredereck, Robert; Faliszewski, Piotr; Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej et al.
Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, Proceedings. ed. / Vittorio Bilo; Michele Flammini. Springer Verlag, 2017. p. 80-92 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 10504 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AB - We investigate how robust are results of committee elections to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single preference order is either that (1) at most one committee member can be replaced, or (2) it is possible that the whole committee can be replaced. We also show that the problem of computing the smallest number of swaps that lead to changing the election outcome is typically NP-hard, but there are natural FPT algorithms. Finally, for a number of rules we assess experimentally the average number of random swaps necessary to change the election result.

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Bredereck R, Faliszewski P, Kaczmarczyk A, Niedermeier R, Skowron P, Talmon N. Robustness among multiwinner voting rules. In Bilo V, Flammini M, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2017. p. 80-92. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_7

Robustness among multiwinner voting rules

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