TY - GEN

T1 - Robustness among multiwinner voting rules

AU - Bredereck, Robert

AU - Faliszewski, Piotr

AU - Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej

AU - Niedermeier, Rolf

AU - Skowron, Piotr

AU - Talmon, Nimrod

N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments. We are grateful to anonymous SAGT reviewers for their useful comments. R. Bredereck was supported by the DFG fellowship BR 5207/2. P. Faliszewski was supported by the NCN, Poland, under project 2016/21/B/ ST6/01509. A. Kaczmarczyk was supported by the DFG project AFFA (BR 5207/1 and NI 369/15). P. Skowron was supported by a Humboldt Fellowship. N. Talmon was supported by an I-CORE ALGO fellowship.
Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017.

PY - 2017/1/1

Y1 - 2017/1/1

N2 - We investigate how robust are results of committee elections to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single preference order is either that (1) at most one committee member can be replaced, or (2) it is possible that the whole committee can be replaced. We also show that the problem of computing the smallest number of swaps that lead to changing the election outcome is typically NP-hard, but there are natural FPT algorithms. Finally, for a number of rules we assess experimentally the average number of random swaps necessary to change the election result.

AB - We investigate how robust are results of committee elections to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single preference order is either that (1) at most one committee member can be replaced, or (2) it is possible that the whole committee can be replaced. We also show that the problem of computing the smallest number of swaps that lead to changing the election outcome is typically NP-hard, but there are natural FPT algorithms. Finally, for a number of rules we assess experimentally the average number of random swaps necessary to change the election result.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85029389464&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_7

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_7

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85029389464

SN - 9783319666990

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 80

EP - 92

BT - Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, Proceedings

A2 - Bilo, Vittorio

A2 - Flammini, Michele

PB - Springer Verlag

T2 - 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2017

Y2 - 12 September 2017 through 14 September 2017

ER -