Robustness among multiwinner voting rules

Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Rolf Niedermeier, Piotr Skowron, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate how robust are results of committee elections to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single preference order is either that (1) at most one committee member can be replaced, or (2) it is possible that the whole committee can be replaced. We also show that the problem of computing the smallest number of swaps that lead to changing the election outcome is typically NP-hard, but there are natural FPT algorithms. Finally, for a number of rules we assess experimentally the average number of random swaps necessary to change the election result.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, Proceedings
EditorsVittorio Bilo, Michele Flammini
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages80-92
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)9783319666990
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2017 - L’Aquila, Italy
Duration: 12 Sep 201714 Sep 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10504 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2017
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityL’Aquila
Period12/09/1714/09/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science (all)

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