Self-imposition of public oversight

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We argue that policymakers may have personal interests in policy restraints channeled through public oversight. Self-imposition of public oversight can be beneficial for the policymaker because it may help alleviate the dynamic inconsistency problem that she otherwise faces. In the setting studied herein, self-imposed public oversight takes the form of a ceiling on tax rates, which can be overridden only with the legislature’s consent. Such a mechanism is shown to credibly commit the policymaker to future tax restraint, thus inducing larger productive effort.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)95-109
Number of pages15
JournalPublic Choice
Issue number1-2
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2018


  • Dynamic inconsistency
  • Legislative oversight
  • Tax caps

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics


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