TY - JOUR
T1 - Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders
AU - Gavious, Arieh
AU - Minchuk, Yizhaq
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2019/2/8
Y1 - 2019/2/8
N2 - We consider two simultaneous, private value, second-price auctions with identical objects for sale and two types of bidders, strong and weak, in the sense of hazard rate stochastic dominance. We show that if the strong bidders are not too strong with respect to the weak bidders, then, by setting an appropriate reserve price, a separating equilibrium exists in which strong bidders will participate in the auction with only strong bidders, and weak bidders will participate in the auction with only weak bidders.
AB - We consider two simultaneous, private value, second-price auctions with identical objects for sale and two types of bidders, strong and weak, in the sense of hazard rate stochastic dominance. We show that if the strong bidders are not too strong with respect to the weak bidders, then, by setting an appropriate reserve price, a separating equilibrium exists in which strong bidders will participate in the auction with only strong bidders, and weak bidders will participate in the auction with only weak bidders.
KW - Auctions
KW - Selling mechanisms
KW - Separating equilibrium
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85043686238&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11590-018-1248-8
DO - 10.1007/s11590-018-1248-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85043686238
VL - 13
SP - 69
EP - 79
JO - Optimization Letters
JF - Optimization Letters
SN - 1862-4472
IS - 1
ER -