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Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs
Ella Segev
,
Aner Sela
Department of Industrial Engineering and Management
Department of Economics
Research output
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Contribution to journal
›
Article
›
peer-review
3
Scopus citations
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Dive into the research topics of 'Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Mathematics
Auctions
98%
Output
52%
Asymmetric Information
23%
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
22%
Random Noise
17%
Costs
10%
Model
9%
Business & Economics
All-pay Auction
100%
Symmetric Information
18%
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
16%
Contests
14%
Asymmetric Information
13%
Costs
5%
Engineering & Materials Science
Costs
13%