Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions

Gal Cohensius, Ella Segev

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


We study asymmetric first price auctions in which bidders place their bids sequentially, one after the other and only once. We show that, when bidders' values are drawn from uniform distributions and are asymmetric, i.e., there is a strong bidder and a weak bidder (the strong bidder's distribution first order stochastically dominates that of the weak bidder's), the expected revenue in the sequential bidding first price auction (when the strong bidder bids first) may be higher than in the simultaneous bidding first price auction as well as the simultaneous bidding second price auction. The expected payoff of the weak bidder is also higher in the sequential first price auction. Therefore a seller interested in increasing revenue facing asymmetric bidders may find it beneficial to order them and let them bid sequentially instead of simultaneously.

Original languageEnglish
Article number20160196
JournalB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2018


  • Asymmetric auctions
  • First price auction
  • Second price auction
  • Sequential bidding

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)


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