Sequential contests with first and secondary prizes

Asaf Iluz, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


We study a sequential two-stage Tullock contest with two asymmetric players. The players compete for two prizes; the player with the highest effort in the first stage wins the secondary prize while the player with the highest total effort in both stages wins the first prize. Both players have the same cost functions where the marginal cost in the first stage is higher than in the second one. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of this contest and reveal a paradoxical behavior such that the players’ utilities increase in their marginal effort cost.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)6-9
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2018


  • Multi-prize contests
  • Multi-stage contests
  • Variable costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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