Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints

Reut Megidish, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a sequential Tullock contest with two stages and two identical prizes. The players compete for one prize in each stage and each player may win either one or two prizes. The players have either decreasing or increasing marginal values for the prizes, which are commonly known, and there is a constraint on the total effort that each player can exert in both stages. We analyze the players' allocations of efforts along both stages when the budget constraints (effort constraints) are either restrictive, nonrestrictive or partially restrictive. In particular, we show that when the players are either symmetric or asymmetric and the budget constraints are restrictive, independent of the players' values for the prizes, each player allocates his effort equally along both stages of the contest.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)215-243
Number of pages29
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume42
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2014

Keywords

  • Budget constrains
  • Sequential contests
  • Tullock contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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