Sequential (one-against-all) contests

Netanel Levi-Tsedek, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


We study sequential contests with n + 1 players. The defender competes sequentially against n heterogeneous attackers in n different contests. While the defender has to win all the contests, each of the attackers needs to win only his own contest. We demonstrate that if the players compete in all-pay contests, the order of the attackers does not affect the defender's expected payoff. On the other hand, if the players compete in Tullock contests, the defender maximizes his expected payoff if he competes first against the strongest attacker (the attacker with the highest value of winning), next against the second strongest attacker and so on until the last stage in which he competes against the weakest attacker.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)9-11
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
StatePublished - 1 Feb 2019


  • All-pay contests
  • Sequential contests
  • Tullock contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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