Sequential (one-against-all) contests

Netanel Levi-Tsedek; Aner Sela

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.11.008

Sequential (one-against-all) contests

Netanel Levi-Tsedek, Aner Sela

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study sequential contests with n + 1 players. The defender competes sequentially against n heterogeneous attackers in n different contests. While the defender has to win all the contests, each of the attackers needs to win only his own contest. We demonstrate that if the players compete in all-pay contests, the order of the attackers does not affect the defender's expected payoff. On the other hand, if the players compete in Tullock contests, the defender maximizes his expected payoff if he competes first against the strongest attacker (the attacker with the highest value of winning), next against the second strongest attacker and so on until the last stage in which he competes against the weakest attacker.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	9-11
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	175
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.11.008
State	Published - 1 Feb 2019

Keywords

All-pay contests
Sequential contests
Tullock contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2018.11.008

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title = "Sequential (one-against-all) contests",

abstract = "We study sequential contests with n + 1 players. The defender competes sequentially against n heterogeneous attackers in n different contests. While the defender has to win all the contests, each of the attackers needs to win only his own contest. We demonstrate that if the players compete in all-pay contests, the order of the attackers does not affect the defender's expected payoff. On the other hand, if the players compete in Tullock contests, the defender maximizes his expected payoff if he competes first against the strongest attacker (the attacker with the highest value of winning), next against the second strongest attacker and so on until the last stage in which he competes against the weakest attacker.",

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AU - Sela, Aner

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N2 - We study sequential contests with n + 1 players. The defender competes sequentially against n heterogeneous attackers in n different contests. While the defender has to win all the contests, each of the attackers needs to win only his own contest. We demonstrate that if the players compete in all-pay contests, the order of the attackers does not affect the defender's expected payoff. On the other hand, if the players compete in Tullock contests, the defender maximizes his expected payoff if he competes first against the strongest attacker (the attacker with the highest value of winning), next against the second strongest attacker and so on until the last stage in which he competes against the weakest attacker.

AB - We study sequential contests with n + 1 players. The defender competes sequentially against n heterogeneous attackers in n different contests. While the defender has to win all the contests, each of the attackers needs to win only his own contest. We demonstrate that if the players compete in all-pay contests, the order of the attackers does not affect the defender's expected payoff. On the other hand, if the players compete in Tullock contests, the defender maximizes his expected payoff if he competes first against the strongest attacker (the attacker with the highest value of winning), next against the second strongest attacker and so on until the last stage in which he competes against the weakest attacker.

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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Sequential (one-against-all) contests

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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