Abstract
One of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land, labor, credit, and product markets. The landlord is often the supplier of credit; he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers; and he often sells raw materials (fertilizers) and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers. How do we explain this phenomenon? What are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices, which often seem to constitute retraints on free trade? The paper is divided into four sections examining interlinked credit and tenancy contracts; marketing and tenancy contracts; possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets. The final section presents the different equilibrium frameworks, monopoly, monopsony, competition, and equilibria with surplus labor.-from Authors
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 695-715 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | American Economic Review |
Volume | 72 |
Issue number | 4 |
State | Published - 1 Jan 1982 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics