@article{0f23dd8ef0b247cbbef3cd7f62228278,
title = "Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities",
abstract = "Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities when forming the grand coalition is efficient. We show that any sharing rule satisfying efficiency, linearity, dummy player and a strong symmetry axioms can be obtained through an average game. Adding an additional axiom, we identify one unique rule satisfying these properties.",
keywords = "Externalities, Shapley value, Sharing the surplus",
author = "In{\'e}s Macho-Stadler and David P{\'e}rez-Castrillo and David Wettstein",
note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank Antoni Calv{\'o}, Johan Eyckmans, Marta Macho-Stadler, Jordi Mass{\'o}, Roberto Serrano and two anonymous referees as well as seminar participants in Barcelona, Beer-Sheva, Jerusalem, London, Montreal, Sevilla, Taipei, Tel Aviv and Tilburg for helpful comments. The authors acknowledge the financial support from BEC2003-01132, Generalitat de Catalunya (2005SGR-00836 and Barcelona Economics, XREA) and the Ben-Gurion University and Sapir College joint Foundation for Research in Economics and Social Issues.",
year = "2007",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.001",
language = "English",
volume = "135",
pages = "339--356",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "1",
}