Signature Based Authentication for Ephemeral Setup Attacks in Vehicular Sensor Networks

Lukasz Krzywiecki; Patryk Koziel; Nisha Panwar

doi:10.1109/NCA.2019.8935058

Signature Based Authentication for Ephemeral Setup Attacks in Vehicular Sensor Networks

Lukasz Krzywiecki
, Patryk Koziel
, Nisha Panwar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we focus on the communication security perspective for connected vehicles that can be categorized into: V2V (Vehicle to Vehicle), V2I (Vehicle to Infrastructure-such as with road side units or a cloud) and the internal vehicle network connections. V2V and V2I improve driving safety and comfort through the dissemination of critical warning messages. We propose a scheme resistant to ephemeral key leakage attacks that imposes pre-computation threat with respect to the static secret key. In particular, the pseudorandom generators that are implemented into the hardware are non-verifiable with respect to sustaining the true randomness while choosing ephemeral keys. We present a formal security model in which the adversary has power to inject ephemeral values of her choice to the protocol and still cannot deduce the static secret keys.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019
Editors	Aris Gkoulalas-Divanis, Mirco Marchetti, Dimiter R. Avresky
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISBN (Electronic)	9781728125220
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2019.8935058
State	Published - 1 Sep 2019
Externally published	Yes
Event	18th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019 - Cambridge, United States Duration: 26 Sep 2019 → 28 Sep 2019

Publication series

Name	2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019

Conference

Conference	18th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019
Country/Territory	United States
City	Cambridge
Period	26/09/19 → 28/09/19

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being

Keywords

Vehicle communication
ephemeral secret leakage
untrusted device

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Information Systems and Management
Computer Networks and Communications
Computer Science Applications
Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Access to Document

10.1109/NCA.2019.8935058

Cite this

Krzywiecki, L., Koziel, P., & Panwar, N. (2019). Signature Based Authentication for Ephemeral Setup Attacks in Vehicular Sensor Networks. In A. Gkoulalas-Divanis, M. Marchetti, & D. R. Avresky (Eds.), 2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019 Article 8935058 (2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2019.8935058

Krzywiecki, Lukasz ; Koziel, Patryk ; Panwar, Nisha. / Signature Based Authentication for Ephemeral Setup Attacks in Vehicular Sensor Networks. 2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019. editor / Aris Gkoulalas-Divanis ; Mirco Marchetti ; Dimiter R. Avresky. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2019. (2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019).

@inproceedings{ab481c1a3cac49abb1498b8683afc3e9,

title = "Signature Based Authentication for Ephemeral Setup Attacks in Vehicular Sensor Networks",

abstract = "In this paper, we focus on the communication security perspective for connected vehicles that can be categorized into: V2V (Vehicle to Vehicle), V2I (Vehicle to Infrastructure-such as with road side units or a cloud) and the internal vehicle network connections. V2V and V2I improve driving safety and comfort through the dissemination of critical warning messages. We propose a scheme resistant to ephemeral key leakage attacks that imposes pre-computation threat with respect to the static secret key. In particular, the pseudorandom generators that are implemented into the hardware are non-verifiable with respect to sustaining the true randomness while choosing ephemeral keys. We present a formal security model in which the adversary has power to inject ephemeral values of her choice to the protocol and still cannot deduce the static secret keys.",

keywords = "Vehicle communication, ephemeral secret leakage, untrusted device",

author = "Lukasz Krzywiecki and Patryk Koziel and Nisha Panwar",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 IEEE.; 18th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019 ; Conference date: 26-09-2019 Through 28-09-2019",

year = "2019",

month = sep,

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doi = "10.1109/NCA.2019.8935058",

language = "English",

series = "2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers",

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Krzywiecki, L, Koziel, P & Panwar, N 2019, Signature Based Authentication for Ephemeral Setup Attacks in Vehicular Sensor Networks. in A Gkoulalas-Divanis, M Marchetti & DR Avresky (eds), 2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019., 8935058, 2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 18th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019, Cambridge, United States, 26/09/19. https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2019.8935058

Signature Based Authentication for Ephemeral Setup Attacks in Vehicular Sensor Networks. / Krzywiecki, Lukasz; Koziel, Patryk; Panwar, Nisha.
2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019. ed. / Aris Gkoulalas-Divanis; Mirco Marchetti; Dimiter R. Avresky. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2019. 8935058 (2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Signature Based Authentication for Ephemeral Setup Attacks in Vehicular Sensor Networks

AU - Krzywiecki, Lukasz

AU - Koziel, Patryk

AU - Panwar, Nisha

PY - 2019/9/1

Y1 - 2019/9/1

N2 - In this paper, we focus on the communication security perspective for connected vehicles that can be categorized into: V2V (Vehicle to Vehicle), V2I (Vehicle to Infrastructure-such as with road side units or a cloud) and the internal vehicle network connections. V2V and V2I improve driving safety and comfort through the dissemination of critical warning messages. We propose a scheme resistant to ephemeral key leakage attacks that imposes pre-computation threat with respect to the static secret key. In particular, the pseudorandom generators that are implemented into the hardware are non-verifiable with respect to sustaining the true randomness while choosing ephemeral keys. We present a formal security model in which the adversary has power to inject ephemeral values of her choice to the protocol and still cannot deduce the static secret keys.

AB - In this paper, we focus on the communication security perspective for connected vehicles that can be categorized into: V2V (Vehicle to Vehicle), V2I (Vehicle to Infrastructure-such as with road side units or a cloud) and the internal vehicle network connections. V2V and V2I improve driving safety and comfort through the dissemination of critical warning messages. We propose a scheme resistant to ephemeral key leakage attacks that imposes pre-computation threat with respect to the static secret key. In particular, the pseudorandom generators that are implemented into the hardware are non-verifiable with respect to sustaining the true randomness while choosing ephemeral keys. We present a formal security model in which the adversary has power to inject ephemeral values of her choice to the protocol and still cannot deduce the static secret keys.

KW - Vehicle communication

KW - ephemeral secret leakage

KW - untrusted device

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M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85077957972

T3 - 2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019

BT - 2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019

A2 - Gkoulalas-Divanis, Aris

A2 - Marchetti, Mirco

A2 - Avresky, Dimiter R.

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

T2 - 18th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019

Y2 - 26 September 2019 through 28 September 2019

ER -

Krzywiecki L, Koziel P, Panwar N. Signature Based Authentication for Ephemeral Setup Attacks in Vehicular Sensor Networks. In Gkoulalas-Divanis A, Marchetti M, Avresky DR, editors, 2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 2019. 8935058. (2019 IEEE 18th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2019). doi: 10.1109/NCA.2019.8935058

Signature Based Authentication for Ephemeral Setup Attacks in Vehicular Sensor Networks

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

UN SDGs

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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Cite this