Sophisticated behavior under majoritarian and non-najoritarian voting procedures

Fany Yuval, Kaisa Herne

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations


This study addresses the issue of sincere and sophisticated voting under majoritarian and non-majoritarian voting procedures. By conducting experimental voting games, we compared a common majoritarian procedure, Plurality Voting (PV) with a non-majoritarian procedure, Sequential Voting by Veto (SVV). We focused on two different aspects of the subject: the likelihood of sophisticated voting under each one of the voting procedures and the conditions that foster sincere and sophisticated voting under these procedures. The results highlighted the significant differences between majoritarian and non-majoritarian voting procedures as a key factor in determining the tendency of voters to use sincere or sophisticated voting. Clearly, the sincere model was dominant in SVV games while sophisticated voting dominated the PV games. The extent of sophisticated voting ran counter to the group size, a tendency that was stronger under SVV than under PV. By demonstrating the advantages of the minority principle, when voters are small in number, we hope to encourage the development of a solution that will enable the use of SVV in general elections.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)217-237
Number of pages21
JournalPolitical Behavior
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Sep 2005
Externally publishedYes


  • Majority principle
  • Minority principle
  • Plurality voting
  • Sophisticated voting
  • Veto voting
  • Voters' behavior

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science


Dive into the research topics of 'Sophisticated behavior under majoritarian and non-najoritarian voting procedures'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this