Abstract
The research reported here was the first empirical examination of strategic voting under the Sequential Voting by Veto (SVV) voting procedure, proposed by Mueller (1978). According to this procedure, a sequence of n voters must select s out of s+m alternatives (m ≥ n ≥ 2; s > 0). Hence, the number of alternatives exceeds the number of participants by one (n+1). When the ith voter casts her vote, she vetoes the alternative against which a veto has not yet been cast, and the s remaining non-vetoed alternatives are elected. The SVV procedure invokes the minority principle, and it has advantages over all majoritarian procedures; this makes SVV a very desirable means for relatively small groups to make collective decisions. Felsenthal and Machover (1992) pointed out three models of voting under SVV: sincere, optimal, and canonical. The current research investigated, through laboratory experiments, which cognitive model better accounts for the voters' observed behavior and the likelihood of obtaining the optimal outcome as a function of the size of n (when s = 1). The findings suggest that while voters under SVV use all three models, their choice is conditioned by group size. In the small groups (n = 3), the canonical mode was a better predictor than the sincere model. In the larger groups (n = 5), the sincere model was a better predictor than the canonical model. There is also evidence of players' learning during the experiment.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 343-369 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | Theory and Decision |
Volume | 53 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Dec 2002 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Minority principle
- Strategic voting
- Veto
- Voters' behavior
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Decision Sciences
- Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
- Applied Psychology
- General Social Sciences
- General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
- Computer Science Applications