Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players

Ezra Einy, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Greenberg (1990) and Ray (1989) showed that in coalitional games with a finite set of players the core consists of those and only those payoffs that cannot be dominated using payoffs in the core of a subgame. We extend the definition of the dominance relation to coalitional games with an infinite set of players and show that this result may not hold in games with a countable set of players (even in convex games). But if a coalitional game with a countable set of players satisfies a mild continuity property, its core consists of those and only those payoff vectors which cannot be dominated using payoffs in the core of a subgame.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)45-50
Number of pages6
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume26
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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