Stable Roommate with Narcissistic, Single-Peaked, and Single-Crossing Preferences

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Ugo Paavo Finnendahl, Rolf Niedermeier

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

10 Scopus citations


The classical Stable Roommate problem asks whether it is possible to pair up an even number of agents such that no two non-paired agents prefer to be with each other rather than with their assigned partners. We investigate Stable Roommate with complete (i.e. every agent can be matched with every other agent) or incomplete preferences, with ties (i.e. two agents are considered of equal value to some agent) or without ties. It is known that in general allowing ties makes the problem NP-complete. We provide algorithms for Stable Roommate that are, compared to those in the literature, more efficient when the input preferences are complete and have some structural property, such as being narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing. However, when the preferences are incomplete and have ties, we show that being single-peaked and single-crossing does not reduce the computational complexity—Stable Roommate remains NP-complete.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Decision Theory - 5th International Conference, ADT 2017, Proceedings
EditorsJorg Rothe
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9783319675039
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2017
Event5th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2017 - Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Duration: 25 Oct 201727 Oct 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10576 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference5th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science


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