Strategic behavior and optimization in a hybrid M/M/1 queue with retrials

Yoav Kerner, Ophir Shmuel-Bittner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

In standard queues, when there are waiting customers, service completions are followed by service commencements. In retrial queues, this is not the case. In such systems, customers try to receive service at a time of their choosing, or the server seeks the next customer for a non-negligible time. In this note, we consider a hybrid model with both a finite standard queue and an orbit. While in the orbit, customers try to join the standard queue in their own time. We assume that the retrial rate is a decision variable, and study both the Nash equilibrium and the socially optimal retrial rates, under a cost model that considers both waiting costs and retrial costs.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)285-302
Number of pages18
JournalQueueing Systems
Volume96
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2020

Keywords

  • Nash equilibrium
  • Retrial queues
  • Social optimization
  • Strategic behavior

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Strategic behavior and optimization in a hybrid M/M/1 queue with retrials'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this