Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments

Alex Krumer, Reut Megidish, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)50-57
Number of pages8
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2023


  • All-pay auctions
  • Multi-stage contests
  • Round-robin tournaments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • General Social Sciences
  • General Psychology
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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