Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments

Alex Krumer; Reut Megidish; Aner Sela

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.02.002

Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments

Alex Krumer, Reut Megidish, Aner Sela

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	50-57
Number of pages	8
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	122
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.02.002
State	Published - 1 Mar 2023

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Multi-stage contests
Round-robin tournaments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
General Social Sciences
General Psychology
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.02.002

Cite this

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abstract = "We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament.",

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AB - We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament.

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Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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