TY - UNPB
T1 - Sybil-Resilient Social Choice with Partial Participation
AU - Meir, Reshef
AU - Shahaf, Gal
AU - Shapiro, Ehud
AU - Talmon, Nimrod
PY - 2020/7/7
Y1 - 2020/7/7
N2 - Voting rules may fail to implement the will of the society when only some voters actively participate, and/or in the presence of sybil (fake or duplicate) voters. Here we aim to address social choice in the presence of sybils and voter abstention. To do so we assume the status-quo (Reality) as an ever-present distinguished alternative, and study Reality Enforcing voting rules, which add virtual votes in support of the status-quo. We measure the tradeoff between safety and liveness (the ability of active honest voters to maintain/change the status-quo, respectively) in a variety of domains, and show that the Reality Enforcing voting rule is optimal in this respect.
AB - Voting rules may fail to implement the will of the society when only some voters actively participate, and/or in the presence of sybil (fake or duplicate) voters. Here we aim to address social choice in the presence of sybils and voter abstention. To do so we assume the status-quo (Reality) as an ever-present distinguished alternative, and study Reality Enforcing voting rules, which add virtual votes in support of the status-quo. We measure the tradeoff between safety and liveness (the ability of active honest voters to maintain/change the status-quo, respectively) in a variety of domains, and show that the Reality Enforcing voting rule is optimal in this respect.
KW - cs.MA
KW - cs.SI
U2 - 10.48550/arXiv.2001.05271
DO - 10.48550/arXiv.2001.05271
M3 - Preprint
BT - Sybil-Resilient Social Choice with Partial Participation
ER -