Sybil-Resilient Social Choice with Low Voter Turnout

Reshef Meir, Nimrod Talmon, Gal Shahaf, Ehud Shapiro

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We address social choice in the presence of sybils (fake or duplicate votes) and low turnout, two behaviors that may each distort the will of the society. To do so we assume the status quo as an ever-present distinguished alternative. We propose a general Reality Enforcing mechanism, which can be combined with arbitrary voting rules and operates by adding virtual votes that support the status quo. We measure the tradeoff between safety and liveness (the ability of non-abstaining non-sybil voters to maintain or to change the status quo, respectively) in a variety of voting domains and show a tight inherent limit to the amount of sybils and abstentions that can be tolerated.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMulti-Agent Systems - 19th European Conference, EUMAS 2022, Proceedings
EditorsDorothea Baumeister, Jörg Rothe
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages257-274
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)9783031206139
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2022
Event19th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2022 - Düsseldorf, Germany
Duration: 14 Sep 202216 Sep 2022

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume13442 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference19th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2022
Country/TerritoryGermany
CityDüsseldorf
Period14/09/2216/09/22

Keywords

  • Computational social choice
  • Sybil attacks
  • Vote abstention

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science

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