TY - GEN
T1 - Sybil-Resistant Meta Strategies for the Forwarder's Dilemma
AU - Durmus, Yunus
AU - Loukas, Andreas
AU - Onur, Ertan
AU - Langendoen, Koen
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 IEEE.
PY - 2014/12/31
Y1 - 2014/12/31
N2 - Cooperation is the foundation of wireless ad hocnetworks with nodes forwarding their neighbors' packets forthe common good. However, energy and bandwidth constraints combined with selfish behaviour lead to collapsed networks where all nodes defect. Researchers have tried to incentivize or enforce the nodes for cooperation in various ways. However, these techniques do not consider the heterogeneous networks in which a diverse set of nodes with different cognitive capabilities exist. Furthermore, in ad hoc networks identity is a fuzzy concept. It is easy to forge multiple identities and hide defective behaviour. Moreover, the nature of the wireless medium is always ambiguous due to collisions, interference and asymmetric links. In all this uncertainty, having complete information about the intentions of the nodes and acting on it is not straightforward. Backed by evolutionary game theory and multi-agent systems research, we adapt and modify two meta strategies to embrace this uncertainty. These modified meta strategies, Win Stay LooseShift and Stochastic Imitate Best Strategy, do not require strict identity information and only depend on nodes' own capabilities. Nodes monitor the traffic in their neighbourhood by using a two-hop overhearing method, and decide whether they should be cooperative or defective. We show that nodes are able to discover and use the best strategy in their locality and protect themselves against the exploitation by free riders who devise Sybil attacks by changing their identities.
AB - Cooperation is the foundation of wireless ad hocnetworks with nodes forwarding their neighbors' packets forthe common good. However, energy and bandwidth constraints combined with selfish behaviour lead to collapsed networks where all nodes defect. Researchers have tried to incentivize or enforce the nodes for cooperation in various ways. However, these techniques do not consider the heterogeneous networks in which a diverse set of nodes with different cognitive capabilities exist. Furthermore, in ad hoc networks identity is a fuzzy concept. It is easy to forge multiple identities and hide defective behaviour. Moreover, the nature of the wireless medium is always ambiguous due to collisions, interference and asymmetric links. In all this uncertainty, having complete information about the intentions of the nodes and acting on it is not straightforward. Backed by evolutionary game theory and multi-agent systems research, we adapt and modify two meta strategies to embrace this uncertainty. These modified meta strategies, Win Stay LooseShift and Stochastic Imitate Best Strategy, do not require strict identity information and only depend on nodes' own capabilities. Nodes monitor the traffic in their neighbourhood by using a two-hop overhearing method, and decide whether they should be cooperative or defective. We show that nodes are able to discover and use the best strategy in their locality and protect themselves against the exploitation by free riders who devise Sybil attacks by changing their identities.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Evolutionary Game Theory
KW - Forwarders Dilemma
KW - Imitate Best Strategy
KW - Network Reciprocity
KW - Win Stay Loose Shift
KW - Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84936857528&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/SASO.2014.21
DO - 10.1109/SASO.2014.21
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84936857528
T3 - International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems, SASO
SP - 90
EP - 99
BT - Proceedings - 2014 IEEE 8th International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems, SASO 2014
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
T2 - 2014 8th IEEE International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems, SASO 2014
Y2 - 8 September 2014 through 12 September 2014
ER -