Tax Evasion as an Outcome of Organizational Design

Joseph Tzur, Varda Yaari

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


This study analyzes tax evasion as the outcome of the internal organization of the tax bureau–namely, the design of the employees’ incentives and work flow. We compare two “extreme” alternatives: the tax bureau as a system of stochastic, costly, in-depth audits and zero incentives for tax agents (SA), or as a “bargaining organization” (BRO) in which tax agents are induced to bargain with taxpayers, and tax returns are audited in depth only if no agreement is reached. We find that collection costs in BRO are lower than in SA, partly because fewer returns are examined, but that incentive costs are higher. In general, BRO is likely to be more efficient if the tax bureau’s commissioner can induce agents to be sufficiently tough negotiators while keeping the incentive costs low.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)47-73
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2000

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)


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