Teams in online scheduling polls: Game-theoretic aspects

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier, Svetlana Obraztsova, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

2 Scopus citations


Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken during the meeting, therefore each team would like to maximize its relative attendance (i.e. the proportional number of its team members attending the meeting). We introduce a corresponding game, where each team can declare a lower total availability in the scheduling poll in order to improve its relative attendance - the pay-off. We are especially interested in situations where teams can form coalitions. We provide an efficient algorithm that, given a coalition, finds an optimal way for each team in a coalition to improve its pay-off. In contrast, we show that deciding whether such a coalition exists is NP-hard. We also study the existence of Nash equilibria: Finding Nash equilibria for various small sizes of teams and coalitions can be done in polynomial time while it is coNP-hard if the coalition size is unbounded.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017 - San Francisco, United States
Duration: 4 Feb 201710 Feb 2017


Conference31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Francisco

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence


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