TY - GEN
T1 - Temporal power redistribution as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks
AU - Zooker, David
AU - Elkoni, Matan
AU - Shalom, Or Ohev
AU - Weizman, Yoav
AU - Levi, Itamar
AU - Keren, Osnat
AU - Fish, Alexander
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE
PY - 2020/1/1
Y1 - 2020/1/1
N2 - Side channel analysis attacks are considered an extreme hardware security hazard for cryptographic devices. There are numerous approaches to prevent attackers from extracting useful information from secured devices. Nonetheless the cost of implementing an effective countermeasure is usually very high in terms of area/performance. In this paper we propose a novel approach to the temporal redistribution of the power information. Specifically, we present a circuit level methodology that makes it possible to manipulate the three main parameters of the current profile during the clock period: the start time of the computation, the duration and the amplitude. The effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure was evaluated on a 4-bit cryptographic function in a 65nm TSMC process. The simulation results indicate that the number of secret bits that leaked from the protected design (i.e., the mutual information) was reduced dramatically from 4 bits to 0.85 bits. In addition, at least 1500 ideal noise-free power traces were required to extract these bits, whereas less than 150 traces were required to extract the whole 4 bits from the unprotected design. The sensitivity of the protected circuit to process and environmental variations are minimal, with measured standard deviation of 0.1bit. The area overhead is up to 32%.
AB - Side channel analysis attacks are considered an extreme hardware security hazard for cryptographic devices. There are numerous approaches to prevent attackers from extracting useful information from secured devices. Nonetheless the cost of implementing an effective countermeasure is usually very high in terms of area/performance. In this paper we propose a novel approach to the temporal redistribution of the power information. Specifically, we present a circuit level methodology that makes it possible to manipulate the three main parameters of the current profile during the clock period: the start time of the computation, the duration and the amplitude. The effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure was evaluated on a 4-bit cryptographic function in a 65nm TSMC process. The simulation results indicate that the number of secret bits that leaked from the protected design (i.e., the mutual information) was reduced dramatically from 4 bits to 0.85 bits. In addition, at least 1500 ideal noise-free power traces were required to extract these bits, whereas less than 150 traces were required to extract the whole 4 bits from the unprotected design. The sensitivity of the protected circuit to process and environmental variations are minimal, with measured standard deviation of 0.1bit. The area overhead is up to 32%.
KW - Hardware security
KW - Power analysis attacks
KW - Side channel analysis
KW - Temporal power redistribution
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85109276123&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85109276123
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems
BT - 2020 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2020 - Proceedings
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
T2 - 52nd IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2020
Y2 - 10 October 2020 through 21 October 2020
ER -