The all-or-nothing nature of two-party secure computation

Amos Beimel, Tal Malkin, Silvio Micali

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

40 Scopus citations

Abstract

A function f is computationally securely computable if two computationally-bounded parties Alice, having a secret input x, and Bob, having a secret input y, can talk back and forth so that (even if one of them is malicious) (1) Bob learns essentially only f (x,y) while (2) Alice learns essentially nothing. We prove that, if any non-trivial function can be so computed, then so can every function. Consequently, the complexity assumptions sufficient and/or required for computationally securely computing f are the same for every non-trivial function f.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 1999 - 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Proceedings
EditorsMichael Wiener
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages80-97
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)3540663479, 9783540663478
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1999
Externally publishedYes
Event19th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 1999 - Santa Barbara, United States
Duration: 15 Aug 199919 Aug 1999

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume1666
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference19th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 1999
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySanta Barbara
Period15/08/9919/08/99

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