The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information

Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the "joint information" of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)473-484
Number of pages12
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume18
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2001

Keywords

  • Core
  • General equilibrium in large exchange economies with differential information
  • Value
  • Weak fine bargaining set

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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