TY - JOUR
T1 - The Coincidence of the Finite and the Infinite in Spinoza and Hegel
AU - de León Serrano, José María Sánchez
AU - Shein, Noa
N1 - Funding Information:
47. We would like to thank Julie Klein and Alan Nelson for their helpful comments on a previous draft and Dustin Atlas for his observations, as well as Miriam Shein for her wise editorial suggestions. This research was made possible by a grant from the Israel Science Foundation (grant no.1912/17). José María Sánchez de León Serrano wishes to thank, in addition, the Martin Buber Society of Fellows at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem for a generous research fellowship during which this paper was written.
Publisher Copyright:
© Idealistic Studies. Volume 49, Issue 1 (Spring 2019). ISSN 0046-8541.
PY - 2019/3/1
Y1 - 2019/3/1
N2 - This paper proposes a reassessment of Hegel's critical reading of Spinoza and of the charge of acosmism, for which this reading is known. We argue that this charge is actually the consequence of a more fundamental criticism, namely Spinoza's presumable inability to conceive the unity of the finite and the infinite. According to Hegel, the infinite and the finite remain two poles apart in Spinoza's metaphysics, which thus fails to be a true monism, insofar as it contains an irreducible duality. Against this reading, we argue that Spinoza's conception of the causal co-determination of finite modes entails the acknowledgment of their essentially infinite nature. The study of this particular instance of coincidentia oppositorum enables to counter some of Hegel's criticisms as well as to illuminate a fairly unexplored aspect of Spinoza's substance monism.
AB - This paper proposes a reassessment of Hegel's critical reading of Spinoza and of the charge of acosmism, for which this reading is known. We argue that this charge is actually the consequence of a more fundamental criticism, namely Spinoza's presumable inability to conceive the unity of the finite and the infinite. According to Hegel, the infinite and the finite remain two poles apart in Spinoza's metaphysics, which thus fails to be a true monism, insofar as it contains an irreducible duality. Against this reading, we argue that Spinoza's conception of the causal co-determination of finite modes entails the acknowledgment of their essentially infinite nature. The study of this particular instance of coincidentia oppositorum enables to counter some of Hegel's criticisms as well as to illuminate a fairly unexplored aspect of Spinoza's substance monism.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85075484766&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.5840/idstudies201989100
DO - 10.5840/idstudies201989100
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85075484766
SN - 0046-8541
VL - 49
SP - 23
EP - 44
JO - Idealistic Studies
JF - Idealistic Studies
IS - 1
ER -