The effect of a reason's truth-value on the judgment of a fallacious argument

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12 Scopus citations


Informal reasoning fallacies are arguments that are psychologically persuasive but not valid. In the context of informal reasoning fallacies, the truth-value of the reason in support of a given claim is irrelevant to judging the validity of the argument as a whole. This property stands in sharp contrast with the general role of the reason's truth-value in judging arguments in general. The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that in the context of informal reasoning fallacies the truth-value of a reason influences pupils' judgment of the extent to which the reason supports the claim. The results of the study confirm the research hypothesis.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)173-184
Number of pages12
JournalActa Psychologica
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Jun 2004


  • Arguments
  • Cognitive processes
  • Reasoning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)


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