The effect of a reason's truth-value on the judgment of a fallacious argument

Yair Neuman; Amnon Glassner; Michael Weinstock

doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2004.01.003

The effect of a reason's truth-value on the judgment of a fallacious argument

Yair Neuman, Amnon Glassner, Michael Weinstock

School of Education

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Informal reasoning fallacies are arguments that are psychologically persuasive but not valid. In the context of informal reasoning fallacies, the truth-value of the reason in support of a given claim is irrelevant to judging the validity of the argument as a whole. This property stands in sharp contrast with the general role of the reason's truth-value in judging arguments in general. The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that in the context of informal reasoning fallacies the truth-value of a reason influences pupils' judgment of the extent to which the reason supports the claim. The results of the study confirm the research hypothesis.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	173-184
Number of pages	12
Journal	Acta Psychologica
Volume	116
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2004.01.003
State	Published - 1 Jun 2004

Keywords

Arguments
Cognitive processes
Reasoning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Developmental and Educational Psychology
Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)

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10.1016/j.actpsy.2004.01.003

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abstract = "Informal reasoning fallacies are arguments that are psychologically persuasive but not valid. In the context of informal reasoning fallacies, the truth-value of the reason in support of a given claim is irrelevant to judging the validity of the argument as a whole. This property stands in sharp contrast with the general role of the reason's truth-value in judging arguments in general. The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that in the context of informal reasoning fallacies the truth-value of a reason influences pupils' judgment of the extent to which the reason supports the claim. The results of the study confirm the research hypothesis.",

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AB - Informal reasoning fallacies are arguments that are psychologically persuasive but not valid. In the context of informal reasoning fallacies, the truth-value of the reason in support of a given claim is irrelevant to judging the validity of the argument as a whole. This property stands in sharp contrast with the general role of the reason's truth-value in judging arguments in general. The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that in the context of informal reasoning fallacies the truth-value of a reason influences pupils' judgment of the extent to which the reason supports the claim. The results of the study confirm the research hypothesis.

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The effect of a reason's truth-value on the judgment of a fallacious argument

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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