The (in) effectiveness of procurement auctions in the public sector

Yizhaq Minchuk, Shlomo Mizrahi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article studies procurement auctions in the public sector using game theoretical tools. The article shows that when participants in an auction are agents with low abilities (low type), as is common in the public sector, they place the same contract request. As a result, the auction mechanism will rarely produce real competition, thus making this mechanism, which limits bidders to those already within the system, ineffective for use in the public sector job market.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)247-249
Number of pages3
JournalApplied Economics Letters
Volume24
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 23 Feb 2017

Keywords

  • Public sector
  • asymmetry
  • auctions
  • procurement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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